The following article was written in the mid '80's, but is none the less appropriate for this discussion about the the pit falls of a voluntary set aside and the unintended consequences of such a policy. As a HRWW  producer I am concerned about the consequences of such a policy on HRWW. 



 CONCLUSIONS High price supports, acreage allotments, and quotas evolved in an era when domestic use was a larger portion of total  commodity use than it is currently. When the domestic market is dominant, price supports can be raised with minimal effects on the amount demanded by the domestic market, especially when there are no close market substitutes. But when the export market grows in importance, U.S. prices supported above world prices lead to a loss of markets. A drop in production achieved by acreage reduction programs is likely to be at least partly offset by competitors overseas. For example, U.S. harvested wheat acreage was about the same in 1984/85 as in 1977/78. But during that period, Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the European Community increased their harvested acreage by about 24 million acres.(we could add the FSU to this list over the last 20 years). Because of stagnant world trade and record production by other exporters, the U.S. share of world wheat trade fell from 48 percent in 1981/82 to an estimated 37 percent during 1984/85.( the current 2016 share of US wheat trade is far lower than it was 30 years ago).  The effectiveness of acreage reduction programs needs to be measured with regard to export markets, the single major growth area for U.S. farm products. Acreage reduction programs typically follow from the judgement of policymakers that prices are too low, stocks are too high, or Government payments--such as for storage or income support--are excessive. Voluntary programs, as managed in the past, have often been an inefficient and costly means to restore market balance. At times, poor weather and export growth have masked the inefficiencies. Acreage reduction provisions have also had to contend with other program provisions, such as loan rates and target prices, which have insulated individual producers from market feedback that would indicate production was exceeding use. Hence, the future of acreage reduction programs will depend on whether policymakers will choose to idle U.S. resources in a competitive world market, whether cost effectiveness can be improved, and whether the reductions can be made complementary with other price and income support provisions.